Libya appears poised to become the first Arab operator of the Pakistan–China co-developed JF-17 Thunder, following credible international reporting that confirms a major defence agreement between Pakistan and Libya’s eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA). If implemented, the deal would represent not only one of Pakistan’s largest-ever arms exports, but also a profound shift in Libya’s future airpower trajectory after more than a decade of conflict, fragmentation, and sanctions.
According to multiple authoritative sources, including Reuters and major Pakistani defence outlets, the agreement covers the acquisition of 16 JF-17 multirole fighter aircraft, alongside 12 Super Mushak trainer aircraft, pilot and technician training, logistical support, and broader military cooperation. The estimated value of the deal ranges between $4 and $4.6 billion, making it one of the most significant defence export contracts in Pakistan’s history.
The Libya–Pakistan defence agreement, including the JF-17 fighter deal, was signed in late January 2026, during a high-level visit by senior Libyan National Army (LNA) representatives to Islamabad, according to Reuters reporting and Pakistani defence ministry sources.
While no formal public signing ceremony was broadcast, multiple diplomatic and defence-industry sources confirmed that final contractual approval was reached between January 22–26, 2026, following several months of negotiations and technical evaluations.
For Libya, the significance of this development cannot be overstated. Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libyan airpower has steadily deteriorated. Once one of the largest and most capable air forces in North Africa, Libya today operates a fragmented and aging fleet composed mainly of legacy MiG-21s, MiG-23s, limited MiG-29s, and a small number of restored Mirage F1 aircraft. Maintenance challenges, shortages of spare parts, pilot attrition, and combat losses have severely degraded operational readiness.
The introduction of a modern multirole fighter such as the JF-17 would instantly alter this picture. Equipped with modern avionics, active electronically scanned array radar options, precision-guided munitions, and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, the JF-17 offers a credible leap into 4.5-generation combat capability. For the Libyan National Army, this would provide not only a significant boost in air superiority and strike potential, but also a symbolic demonstration of military modernisation and political legitimacy.
Strategically, the choice of the JF-17 is revealing. Western fighter aircraft remain politically inaccessible due to sanctions, human rights concerns, and unresolved legitimacy issues surrounding Libya’s competing authorities. Russian combat aircraft, while available, present logistical, financial, and geopolitical risks amid Moscow’s own operational commitments and growing international isolation. In this context, Pakistan offers a politically flexible, cost-effective, and technically capable alternative, supported by Chinese industrial backing and supply chains.
For Pakistan, the Libyan agreement represents a breakthrough moment in its defence export ambitions. The JF-17 programme has long sought to establish itself as a credible competitor in the global light fighter market, targeting air forces constrained by limited budgets, political restrictions, or sanctions. While earlier exports to Myanmar and Nigeria validated the platform’s export viability, Libya would mark the first Arab and North African customer, opening an entirely new strategic market space.
This deal also strengthens Pakistan’s broader geopolitical footprint in North Africa and the Mediterranean region. By becoming a long-term supplier of combat aircraft, training, and logistical support, Islamabad embeds itself deeply into Libya’s future military architecture. Such relationships tend to endure for decades, shaping doctrine, interoperability, and procurement alignment.
However, the agreement is not without controversy. Libya remains subject to a United Nations arms embargo, and while the Libyan National Army claims legal justifications under existing frameworks, the international community remains divided on the legitimacy of large-scale arms transfers. Western governments are likely to scrutinise any delivery process closely, potentially exerting diplomatic pressure to delay or limit implementation.
Despite these obstacles, available evidence suggests that preparations are moving forward. Training pipelines, infrastructure upgrades, and logistical planning reportedly form part of the broader agreement, indicating that this is not a symbolic or preliminary memorandum, but a structured long-term programme.
The deal also reflects a deeper structural trend: the gradual emergence of non-Western suppliers as dominant players in politically complex markets. Pakistan, supported by China’s industrial base, is positioning itself as a strategic alternative to traditional Western and Russian arms exporters, offering flexible financing, political neutrality, and adaptable support models.
If successfully implemented, the Libyan JF-17 programme may well become a flagship case study for Pakistan’s future defence exports, and a model for similar acquisitions across Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia.
In this context, Libya’s decision represents more than a fighter acquisition. It signals a strategic realignment, a reconstruction of national military capability, and the quiet entry of Pakistan into the heart of North African defence geopolitics.
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