Desde finales de los noventa la Fuerza Aérea Chilena ha venido entrenándose para operaciones militares a gran escala, copiando la doctrina de la USAF, que no son de mucha aplicación en Sudamérica.
Si Chile entrara en guerra con un país vecino, las operaciones de combate durarían unos 10-14 días, ya que los aviones enemigos y las bases aéreas enemigas serían derribados y bombardeados facilmente, pero tras esta labor la FACH no se encuentra preparada para una guerra de guerrillas o irregular.
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Since the beginning of the Chilean Air Force (FACH) modernization process -- in the late 1990’s -- the use of Chilean air power has been guided in the context of large-scale major combat operations. In that type of fight, the current Chilean doctrine (a copy almost word by word of the U.S. Air Force doctrine) does an exceptional job of defining “traditional” roles that unfortunately do not necessarily apply to the current realities of South America.
For instance, and if Chile goes to war against one or more of its neighbors traditional air–to-air combat operations will probably last between 10 to 14 days. Two weeks… that’s all. After hunting down every single jet fighter (if any) and bombing every operational enemy runway the Chilean Air Force (FACH) will then realize that the current force design was not well suited for dealing with the new kind of Irregular Warfare (IW) in which modern air forces find themselves today.
As soon as the FACH realizes that there are no more integrated air defenses to penetrate, that there is no air threat to counter, and no traditional strategic targets left for air power to destroy… Chilean Air Force Generals will be then tasked to quickly adapt by giving the best possible support to ground-combat elements. With their armies destroyed and their tanks and bases in flames their enemies will quickly throw away their uniforms -- hide among the population -- and quickly attempt to take control of certain strategic choke points in the Andes Mountains. As soon as the first guerrilla attacks start killing hundreds of Chilean soldiers the FACH will be then required to counter asymmetric, irregular and hybrid threats for the rest of the campaign. So, and if that’s the most likely scenario for the FACH then the new operational environment begs the question: But to provide Close Air Support (CAS) with what?.
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