El bloqueo del FCAS abre la puerta a Saab y al KAAN turco en la carrera por el futuro caza español

El Futuro Sistema Aéreo de Combate (FCAS), el ambicioso programa europeo destinado a dotar a Francia, Alemania y España de un caza de sexta generación y un ecosistema de combate integrado, se encuentra en un punto crítico. A comienzos de 2026, tras más de una década de desarrollo y miles de millones de inversión, el proyecto está prácticamente paralizado debido a tensiones entre Francia y Alemania, que no logran ponerse de acuerdo sobre liderazgo industrial, reparto de competencias y prioridades tecnológicas. La decisión sobre la continuidad del programa se ha aplazado indefinidamente, dejando a España en una posición especialmente delicada: depende del FCAS para reemplazar al Eurofighter y al F-18, pero carece de un “plan B” industrial propio para asegurar la continuidad de su fuerza aérea.

Frente a este bloqueo, España comienza a explorar alternativas internacionales que le permitan garantizar su operatividad y el desarrollo industrial asociado al caza de nueva generación. Dos opciones principales emergen en el horizonte: Turquía, con sus programas HÜRJET y KAAN, y Suecia, a través de Saab, que mantiene abierta la puerta a colaboraciones en un caza de sexta generación o en plataformas complementarias. Ambas alternativas buscan ofrecer a Madrid un camino más estable frente a la incertidumbre del FCAS.

Turquía, el KAAN y el Hürjet como punto de partida 

El HÜRJET, cuya versión para el Ejército del Aire recibe el nombre de SAETA II, el entrenador avanzado turco, ha ganado relevancia internacional tras la firma de un contrato con España para reemplazar sus F-5 a partir de 2028. Más allá de ser un simple entrenador, el HÜRJET está diseñado para preparar pilotos para cazas de quinta generación, integrando fusión de sensores, capacidad de guerra en red y conceptos de colaboración hombre-máquina. Su diseño supersonico, arquitectura abierta y coste operativo relativamente bajo lo hacen atractivo para España, especialmente en el contexto de modernización rápida y con restricciones presupuestarias.

El caza KAAN, en desarrollo por Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), complementa la oferta turca como avión de combate de quinta generación. Aunque aún no en servicio, su propuesta incluye capacidades avanzadas de combate aéreo, sigilo limitado y compatibilidad con sistemas de entrenamiento como el HÜRJET, lo que permitiría a España mantener una cadena de formación y operativa coherente en caso de optar por esta vía.

Suecia y Saab

Por su parte, Saab ha expresado su disposición a colaborar con España en programas de caza de próxima generación, incluso ofreciendo opciones más flexibles que podrían adaptarse a las necesidades españolas. La empresa escandinava apuesta por la cooperación industrial abierta, con acceso a tecnologías críticas y participación real en el desarrollo de plataformas tripuladas y no tripuladas. Para España, Saab representa una alternativa confiable y modular, que no dependería de la resolución de conflictos internos entre socios del FCAS y permitiría mantener una industria nacional activa y competitiva.

La posición estratégica de España

España, consciente de que carece del músculo industrial de Francia o Alemania, ha adoptado una posición prudente pero estratégica: no busca liderar ni confrontar, sino asegurar certidumbre, retorno industrial y continuidad operativa. Para Madrid, la prioridad no es tener el FCAS perfecto, sino garantizar que exista un programa que funcione y en el que pueda participar realmente, evitando quedar atrapada en el conflicto franco-alemán o depender completamente de sistemas estadounidenses.

Entre sus prioridades destacan:

• Certidumbre de calendario y continuidad: el Ejército del Aire necesita saber qué avión tendrá, cuándo y a qué coste. Los retrasos acumulados y la parálisis del FCAS representan un riesgo estratégico.
• Retorno industrial tangible: España exige que Indra, Airbus España e ITP Aero tengan un papel significativo en sistemas, estructuras y mantenimiento, con acceso a tecnologías críticas y carga de trabajo estable.
• Flexibilidad para alternativas: Madrid estudia cómo integrarse en programas como el HÜRJET/KAAN o en desarrollos suecos sin comprometer su posición en Europa.

Comparativa general de alternativas:

FCAS (Francia-Alemania-España)

• Contras: Desarrollo paralizado , bloqueo político, retrasos, e incertidumbre industrial

• Ventajas: Caza de sexta generación, integración total de combate

KAAN (Turquía)

• Contras: Dependencia de Turquía, interoperabilidad con OTAN parcial
• Ventajas: HÜRJET certificado, KAAN en desarrollo. Cadena de formación completa, bajo coste operativo, rápida disponibilidad

Programas Saab (Suecia)

• Contras: plazos y alcance dependientes de acuerdos bilaterales, sin integración total
• Ventajas: Estudios avanzados, flexibles, cooperación industrial abierta, acceso a tecnologías críticas.

España se encuentra, por tanto, en un momento decisivo: mantener vivo el FCAS con Francia y Alemania, asumiendo sus retrasos y riesgos, o explorar alternativas consolidadas con Turquía y Suecia que aseguren continuidad operativa, industrial y tecnológica. La flexibilidad, la certidumbre de calendario y la participación industrial real serán determinantes para decidir el futuro del combate aéreo español en la próxima década.

Mientras tanto, la industria española observa con atención. La participación activa en cualquier programa de caza del futuro será clave para mantener competencias estratégicas y empleo especializado, y para evitar que España quede relegada a un rol de mero cliente externo en tecnologías críticas de defensa europea.

The Indonesian Ministry of Defense signs a Letter of Intent for the M-346 Block 20.

In a strategic move to modernize its air force, the Indonesian Ministry of Defense took a decisive step by signing a Letter of Intent (LoI) on February 4, 2026, with the Italian firm Leonardo. This agreement, sealed during the Singapore Airshow 2026, positions the M-346F Block 20 as the cornerstone for the generational transition of its training and light combat fleet.

Farewell to the Hawk Era

The arrival of the M-346F will mark the end of service for the veteran BAE Systems Hawk (models 109 and 209), which have been the backbone of advanced training in Indonesia for decades. The M-346 will not only take over the training role but, in its "F" (Fighter) variant, will provide multi-mission light combat capabilities, allowing the Indonesian Air Force (TNI-AU) to operate with greater flexibility in air-to-air and air-to-ground missions.

Technological Leap: The Block 20 Standard

The Block 20 configuration chosen by Jakarta represents the technological pinnacle of this model. Its most notable features include:

• AESA Radar: A cutting-edge sensor for high-precision detection and tracking of multiple targets.

• Digital Cockpit with LAD: Two Large Area Displays (LAD) that optimize the human-machine interface.

• Advanced Connectivity: Equipped with Link 16 data link and state-of-the-art electronic countermeasure systems.

• Refueling Capability: Includes an in-flight refueling probe, significantly extending its operational range.

Cooperation and Regional Impact

The agreement covers more than just the purchase of aircraft; it boosts the local industry through a partnership with the Indonesian company PT ESystem Solutions. This collaboration will focus on localizing Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul (MRO) services, as well as developing specialized human capital within the country.

This announcement comes just one day after Boeing confirmed the end of its campaign to sell the F-15EX to Indonesia, highlighting a shift in priorities toward platforms that balance operational costs with high technological capability.

Vietnam, the Rafale Rumors

 

Recent commentary in European media and on social networks has suggested that Vietnam could become a future customer for the Dassault Rafale, a claim that has sparked considerable discussion within defence and aviation circles. While the idea is not entirely implausible given Vietnam’s ongoing effort to diversify its military suppliers, the available evidence points to a far more cautious and preliminary situation than some headlines imply.

For decades, the Vietnam People’s Air Force has relied almost exclusively on Russian-built aircraft, including the Su-27 and Su-30 families. This dependence has become increasingly complex in recent years due to geopolitical shifts, sanctions on Russia, and supply chain uncertainty. As a result, Hanoi has quietly explored alternative suppliers and platforms, particularly in the training and support segments, signalling a long-term interest in diversifying its procurement strategy rather than committing to any single Western fighter programme immediately.

The Rafale has appeared periodically in discussions about Vietnam’s potential future fleet. Reports referenced by French media outlets indicate that Vietnamese personnel have had exposure to the aircraft in the past, including opportunities to observe or fly Western platforms during multinational deployments. Such interactions are not unusual and do not necessarily represent procurement intent. Many air forces conduct familiarisation flights or technical exchanges as part of broader defence diplomacy without progressing toward acquisition.

From a market perspective, Dassault Aviation has enjoyed considerable success in Southeast Asia, most notably with Indonesia’s order for 42 Rafales. This regional presence naturally fuels speculation that neighbouring countries could follow a similar path. However, speculation alone does not equal negotiation. To date, there has been no confirmed government-to-government agreement, request for proposals, or formal negotiation publicly acknowledged by either Vietnam or France regarding a Rafale purchase.

More credible indicators of Vietnam’s near-term direction point elsewhere. Several defence analyses and industry reports suggest that US-made fighters, particularly the F-16 Block 70/72, may represent a more realistic option should Vietnam move toward Western combat aircraft in the next decade. The reasons are largely practical. The F-16 offers broad international support networks, lower acquisition costs compared to twin-engine European fighters, and potential political benefits linked to expanding security ties with the United States.

That said, the Rafale cannot be entirely ruled out over the long term. Vietnam’s strategic planning tends to be incremental and pragmatic, balancing cost, operational independence, and political flexibility. Western European aircraft, including Rafale or Gripen, remain theoretically compatible with Vietnam’s diversification goals, especially if export financing, industrial cooperation, or regional partnerships become attractive factors.

The broader context also matters. Vietnam’s defence policy is traditionally cautious, avoiding rapid shifts that could disrupt regional balance or provoke political sensitivities. Major combat aircraft acquisitions require years of technical evaluation, budget planning, infrastructure adaptation, and diplomatic negotiation. Even if interest existed today, an operational transition to a completely new Western fighter ecosystem would likely be gradual rather than immediate.

In short, current claims that Vietnam is on the verge of purchasing Rafales are not supported by publicly verifiable defence procurement evidence. What exists instead is a pattern of exploratory engagement, strategic observation, and long-term market positioning by multiple manufacturers seeking opportunities in Southeast Asia’s evolving defence landscape.

The Rafale remains a credible candidate in theory, but for now it is best understood as part of a wider conversation rather than an imminent contract. Vietnam’s fighter modernisation path is still unfolding, shaped by budgetary realities, political considerations, and the careful balancing act that has long defined Hanoi’s defence strategy.

Singapore Bolsters Airlift Fleet with Legacy Ex Spanish Air Force C-130 Hercules Acquisitions

The Republic of Singapore Air Force (RSAF) has begun taking delivery of legacy Lockheed-Martin C-130H Hercules aircraft to replace its ageing C-130B fleet, a move confirmed by RSAF Chief Maj. Gen. Kelvin Fan ahead of the Singapore Airshow. According to Fan, the decision follows a thorough evaluation of airlift capabilities, confirming that the C-130 platform remains the most suitable choice for Singapore’s operational needs for the next 15 to 20 years.

While the official announcement did not specify the number of aircraft acquired or their origins, open-source tracking indicates that at least three C-130Hs have arrived in Singapore since mid-December. These include a standard C-130H (US registration N974BA), a KC-130H tanker (N973BA), and a stretched C-130H-30 variant (N977BA). Observers from Breaking Defense confirmed the arrival of the final aircraft on January 30.

The aircraft now entering RSAF service are known to be former Ejército del Aire C-130H Hercules. Spain retired its remaining C-130Hs from active service in the early 2020s following the introduction of the Airbus A400M Atlas. After withdrawal, several airframes were placed in storage, remaining preserved but inactive for a period before being sold on the secondary market. These aircraft were subsequently acquired by Blue Aerospace, a Florida-based company specialising in the resale of surplus military airframes, which handled their storage, maintenance, and preparation for onward transfer.

Flight data reveals that the aircraft previously belonged to Blue Aerospace, which is currently advertising a mix of standard C-130Hs, C-130H-30s, and KC-130Hs for sale. The company has highlighted the relatively good material condition of these aircraft, reflecting their late-service upgrades under Spanish operation and the limited fatigue accumulated prior to retirement. Blue Aerospace did not respond to media requests for comment at the time of publication.

The acquisition represents a pragmatic approach by the RSAF. Operating a fleet of older C-130Bs had become increasingly challenging, with airframes approaching the end of their service lives and maintenance costs rising. By sourcing well-maintained, second-hand C-130Hs, Singapore ensures continuity of tactical airlift, medevac, and logistical operations while avoiding the cost and lead times associated with new-build aircraft.

This is not the first time Singapore has leveraged legacy Western airframes to sustain its operational capacity. Previous RSAF C-130 acquisitions have similarly relied on second-hand aircraft, subsequently upgraded with local avionics, mission systems, and structural refurbishment to extend service life and improve interoperability.

Notably, the incoming aircraft include a KC-130H tanker variant. While Singapore does not routinely operate the C-130 as a dedicated aerial refuelling platform, the presence of a tanker-configured airframe provides additional flexibility for specialised missions or potential future role adaptation.

Overall, the transfer of ex-Spanish Air Force C-130Hs—via storage and resale by Blue Aerospace—highlights a broader global trend. As air forces modernise, surplus but structurally sound aircraft continue to offer cost-effective, low-risk solutions for nations seeking to maintain essential capabilities. For Singapore, these Hercules are set to remain a backbone of airlift operations well into the 2030s.

Cómo el Reino Unido preparó la defensa de Gibraltar de posibles ataques de España y la Unión Soviética en los 80

(Del Artículo original publicado en el blog 'Thin Pinstriped Line')

En las primeras horas de mayo de 1982, tras indicios de que una fuerza anfibia española —oficialmente en maniobras— había comenzado a navegar cada vez más cerca de Gibraltar, el Gobernador ejerció sus poderes para ordenar la salida de buques de guerra de la Royal Navy y desplegar al Royal Army en las calles del Peñón, con el objetivo de defenderlo ante una posible invasión española.

Esto puede sonar al argumento de una novela barata de la Guerra Fría, pero estuvo sorprendentemente cerca de suceder. Este artículo analiza cómo, durante la década de 1980, el Reino Unido planificó activamente la defensa de Gibraltar tanto frente a una agresión soviética como española, en circunstancias tan improbables como delicadas.

En 1982, las relaciones entre el Reino Unido y España seguían siendo tensas debido a la cuestión de Gibraltar, especialmente tras el cierre de la frontera terrestre por parte de España en 1969. A lo largo de los años setenta existió una preocupación real de que España pudiera intentar algún tipo de acción militar limitada, lo que llevó a desarrollar planes detallados para defender “el Peñón” el tiempo suficiente como para permitir que prevalecieran soluciones diplomáticas.

La invasión argentina de las Islas Malvinas incrementó de forma notable estas preocupaciones, dado el papel militar clave que desempeñaban las instalaciones británicas en Gibraltar en el apoyo a la Fuerza de Tareas enviada al Atlántico Sur.

En abril de 1982, los Jefes de Estado Mayor británicos revisaron con urgencia los planes y capacidades necesarias para mantener Gibraltar a salvo, tanto frente a un posible ataque argentino como para disuadir a España de aprovechar una eventual distracción del Reino Unido, tanto a corto como a medio plazo.

Los planes para reforzar el Peñón se conocían como Joint Tactical Plan (JTP) 52, y estaban diseñados para responder al riesgo de una agresión española. Tal y como señalaban los propios mandos:

“El plan contempla el refuerzo de Gibraltar ante una amenaza directa contra el Peñón, no un plan de contingencia para una guerra con España. Naturalmente, si los acontecimientos escalaran hasta un nivel tan desafortunado, se asignarían las fuerzas apropiadas según dictara la situación”.

Una de las principales preocupaciones inmediatas fue la presencia de una fuerza anfibia española con unos 4.000 infantes de marina embarcados, operando a apenas 35 millas de la colonia entre el 26 de abril y el 4 de mayo. Aunque la amenaza se consideraba extremadamente improbable, no podía descartarse por completo.

Para reducir este riesgo, se desplegaron en Gibraltar dos aviones de ataque SEPECAT Jaguar de la RAF y un helicóptero Lynx de la Royal Navy, proporcionando una capacidad básica de ataque antibuque frente a unidades españolas que pudieran representar una amenaza para el Peñón.

El comandante en jefe en Gibraltar estaba lo suficientemente preocupado como para ordenar formalmente la puesta en marcha de “preparativos encubiertos para hacer frente a cualquier intento —admitidamente extremadamente improbable— de asalto anfibio contra Gibraltar”.

Estas medidas incluían la preparación discreta de buques de la Royal Navy para hacerse a la mar con muy poco preaviso, con el fin de vigilar a la fuerza anfibia si se desplazaba hacia el este, fuera de la zona de ejercicios, en dirección a Gibraltar. De continuar ese movimiento, las unidades del Ejército pasarían a un estado de máxima alerta, con las tripulaciones aéreas ya en cabina.

Las reglas de enfrentamiento (ROE) propuestas establecían que la Royal Navy no abriría fuego hasta que el “enemigo” disparase primero o hubiese desembarcado en Gibraltar y abierto fuego allí. Resulta especialmente significativo que estas ROE se refiriesen explícitamente a las tropas españolas como “enemigo en territorio de Gibraltar”.

España, por supuesto, no invadió Gibraltar. Sin embargo, el episodio llevó al Ministerio de Defensa británico a una revisión urgente de las defensas necesarias para hacer frente a “la situación en la que un comandante español local pudiera decidir intentar una aventura no autorizada y sin apoyo contra el Peñón”.

Las conclusiones fueron preocupantes: existía una clara insuficiencia de artillería antiaérea —dependiendo todavía de cañones Bofors de 40 mm de la Segunda Guerra Mundial para defender el aeródromo—, una capacidad limitada de contrabatería frente a la artillería española (16 piezas de 105 mm y misiles antiaéreos) y una notable carencia de radares de vigilancia.

El gran dilema residía en equilibrar la necesidad de defender y reforzar Gibraltar con la de gestionar las tensiones locales y las relaciones diplomáticas. Un refuerzo militar demasiado visible podría incrementar las tensiones y dañar seriamente las relaciones bilaterales. Por ello, todas las medidas debían aplicarse manteniendo un perfil lo más bajo posible.

Tras el final de la Guerra de las Malvinas, el Reino Unido continuó preocupado por la defensa de Gibraltar, tanto ante el riesgo de una “aventura” española no autorizada como frente a una posible guerra general con la Unión Soviética. Durante varios años, la RAF mantuvo un destacamento permanente de dos Jaguar en Gibraltar para proporcionar apoyo aéreo cercano inmediato, mientras que la Royal Navy desplegó un Lynx equipado con misiles antibuque y sensores de vigilancia.

A esto se sumaban visitas regulares de otros aviones de la RAF. La idea era sustituir una presencia permanente visible por destacamentos rotatorios, manteniendo al mismo tiempo un mensaje claro de disuasión. También se contempló el despliegue de misiles Exocet como refuerzo de la defensa de la OTAN en el Estrecho.

El Ministerio de Defensa deseaba desplegar estos sistemas hacia 1985, pero la primera ministra Margaret Thatcher optó por la cautela, buscando no poner en riesgo las relaciones con España sin dejar de cumplir los compromisos con la OTAN.

El despliegue de Misiles antibuque Exocet

Según puede determinarse, el Exocet fue desplegado en Gibraltar hacia 1986, cuando la amenaza española ya había disminuido notablemente. De hecho, en 1983 el Comité Conjunto de Inteligencia había concluido que:

“No existe probabilidad de un ataque a nivel de brigada contra Gibraltar. Sin embargo, siempre existirá la posibilidad de que un comandante local intente una acción de bajo nivel contra el Peñón. Es poco probable que tal operación cuente con el apoyo de mandos superiores o del Gobierno español, pero no puede garantizarse una alerta temprana”.

El Ministerio de Defensa consideraba que, con las defensas existentes, el Reino Unido podría resistir con éxito un ataque limitado:

“Para hacer frente a la amenaza española, actualmente hay en Gibraltar un batallón de infantería regular, equipado con misiles MILAN y morteros, apoyado por una compañía y seis piezas LIGHT GUN del Regimiento de Gibraltar. Un asalto sorpresa de infantería española podría ganar algo de terreno, pero gracias a las excelentes posiciones defensivas del Peñón, el ataque debería detenerse rápidamente cerca del aeródromo”.

La Amenaza de la Unión Soviética 

Aun así, la amenaza soviética seguía siendo prioritaria. El Ministerio de Defensa evaluaba que, en caso de guerra, Gibraltar sería un objetivo clave para la URSS mediante el minado de accesos al puerto o al Estrecho, la infiltración de fuerzas especiales desde submarinos o buques mercantes, ataques con misiles lanzados desde submarinos y ataques aéreos con bombarderos medios empleando bombas y misiles de largo alcance.

Para demostrar a la OTAN el compromiso británico con la defensa del Estrecho, se decidió finalmente desplegar el Exocet en algún momento de 1985. Los registros sobre su servicio son escasos, pero todo indica que estuvo operativo a finales de los años ochenta y que ya había dejado de emplearse de forma rutinaria en torno a 1991, tras el colapso de la amenaza.

La retirada definitiva del Exocet del servicio de la Royal Navy en 1997 marcó también el fin de su presencia en Gibraltar, en un contexto en el que la amenaza española había desaparecido por completo.

Esta historia ilustra las dificultades de planificar para contingencias impensables. Resulta casi increíble que, hace apenas 40 años, el Reino Unido considerase que existía una amenaza militar remota pero creíble contra Gibraltar y planificase activamente cómo defenderse de un ataque sorpresa español. Afortunadamente, las relaciones bilaterales actuales son mucho más sólidas, y este escenario pertenece hoy al ámbito del “qué hubiera pasado si”, no a las salas de planificación militar.

Artículo original publicado en el blog 'Thin Pinstriped Line'

India Turns to Ex-Ecuador, French and Omani Jaguars to Keep Its Fleet Flying

The SEPECAT Jaguar has long been a workhorse for the Indian Air Force (IAF). Introduced in the late 1970s, this subsonic strike aircraft has performed close air support, deep strike, and reconnaissance roles across decades of operations. Today, the Jaguar remains a critical component of India’s strike capability, even as its airframes age and production lines have long since closed.

Maintaining a fleet of legacy aircraft is never straightforward. India faces the classic challenge of operating a platform for which no new production exists. Engines, landing gear, avionics, and specialized structural components cannot simply be ordered from a manufacturer. To address this, the IAF has relied on a strategy of selective cannibalization from retired airframes, a practice that has become central to sustaining the Jaguar fleet.

Oman has played a pivotal role in this logistics equation. In 2018–2019, the Royal Air Force of Oman retired a number of Jaguars, which India acquired primarily to harvest spare parts. These aircraft were never intended to fly in Indian service; instead, they provide engines, mission avionics, landing gear, and other high-value components that are increasingly difficult to obtain from original suppliers. The Omani airframes effectively extend the operational life of India’s active fleet, allowing the IAF to plan for Jaguar operations well into the mid-2030s.

More recently, attention has turned to Ecuador. Reports indicate that the Ecuadorian Air Force has four Jaguars in storage, preserved since their retirement. India has opened discussions to acquire these airframes, following the same model as the Omani deal: dismantle for parts, integrate into India’s existing Jaguar logistics chain, and maintain fleet readiness. By securing multiple sources of retired airframes, India reduces dependency on a single supplier and ensures the continuity of a complex, legacy supply chain.

The Jaguar is the only aircraft of its type still in operational service with India, and the FMS and original European production lines no longer exist. The only practical way to sustain the fleet is to source retired airframes from other operators, either through direct purchase or through carefully negotiated transfers. India has already done this with airframes from France, Oman, and now looks to Ecuador. Each acquisition strengthens the supply pipeline and secures the ability to operate the aircraft in key strike and reconnaissance roles.

The Jaguars acquired from Oman or Ecuador are purely for sustainment purposes. The IAF is maintaining the current operational fleet size while mitigating the risks associated with an aging platform. This is a practical, low-profile solution that ensures operational continuity without major capital expenditure or the complexity of introducing an entirely new aircraft type.

The IAF’s approach demonstrates a pragmatic application of air logistics in a resource-constrained environment. By carefully sourcing retired airframes, prioritizing cannibalization, and integrating parts into a central maintenance pipeline, India is able to extend the life of its Jaguars for another decade and a half, while simultaneously preparing for gradual replacement by modern platforms in the 2030s.

Peru Moves Closer to the F-16 Block 70

Peru’s long-running search for a modern multirole fighter appears to be entering a decisive phase. Recent developments surrounding a potential acquisition of the F-16 Block 70/72 point to a growing alignment between Lima and Washington, one that goes beyond aircraft procurement and into the realm of long-term strategic partnership.

The trigger for renewed attention is the formal approval by the United States government of a possible Foreign Military Sale (FMS) to Peru. As part of this notification to the US Congress, Peru requested 12 F-16 Block 70 aircraft (10 single-seat F-16C and 2 dual-seat F-16D) along with engines, AESA radar, weapons integration, training, logistics, and sustainment. The estimated value of the package exceeds USD 3.4 billion, reflecting not just airframes, but a complete capability ecosystem.

An FMS notification is not a signed contract, but it is a critical political and procedural milestone. It confirms that the US government is willing to sell the aircraft, release sensitive technology, and back the programme at a state-to-state level. Without this step, no F-16 deal would be possible at all.

From an operational standpoint, the F-16 Block 70 offers Peru a mature yet future-proof platform. Equipped with the AN/APG-83 AESA radar, modern electronic warfare systems, and full NATO-standard weapons compatibility, the Block 70 is effectively a “new-build Viper” with a projected service life exceeding 8,000 flight hours. For the Fuerza Aérea del Perú (FAP), this would represent a generational leap from its aging Mirage 2000P fleet and long-retired MiG-29s.

The attraction of the F-16 is not limited to performance. The aircraft comes with deep interoperability benefits, particularly with the United States and regional partners already operating the type. Training pipelines, spare parts availability, and upgrade pathways are well established, reducing long-term risk compared to more bespoke solutions.

Strategically, the potential deal signals a clear geopolitical orientation. Choosing the F-16 would anchor Peru firmly within the US security framework in the Americas, reinforcing defence ties at a time when Washington is actively countering Russian and Chinese influence in Latin American defence markets. Fighter aircraft are not neutral purchases; they shape doctrine, training, intelligence sharing, and alignment for decades.

Peru has not yet publicly announced a final decision. Other contenders — notably Saab’s Gripen and Dassault’s Rafale — have been evaluated, and domestic political, budgetary, and industrial considerations remain in play. Financing terms, delivery timelines, and parliamentary approval will ultimately determine whether intent becomes contract.

What can be said with confidence is that the process has moved beyond speculation. An FMS approval places the F-16 Block 70 at the centre of Peru’s fighter replacement effort, not as a theoretical option, but as a politically and technically viable path forward.

If the deal is closed, Peru would join a growing group of air forces opting for advanced yet proven Western fighters, prioritising sustainability and alliance integration over experimentation. For the FAP, it would mark the most significant combat aviation decision since the acquisition of the Mirage 2000 in the 1980s — and one that will define its airpower posture well into the 2040s.

For now, the signal is clear: Peru is not merely shopping for aircraft; it is weighing a strategic realignment, and the F-16 Block 70 sits squarely at the heart of that choice.

Movimientos de aviones militares estadounidenses desde Morón y Rota en un contexto de creciente tensión con Irán

En los últimos días se ha observado un incremento de movimientos de aviones militares estadounidenses hacia Oriente Medio, detectados a través de seguimiento de vuelos de fuentes abiertas y cuentas especializadas en aviación militar. Estos movimientos han generado un escenario de preparación operativa y disuasión reforzada, más que una decisión inmediata de ataque, que podrían llevar a una posible acción militar contra Irán. 

Morón y Rota, el papel logístico de las bases estadounidenses en España 

(Recientes movimientos de KC-135 de la USAF desde la base de Morón mostrados por el usuario de X @WarMonitor3

La Base Aérea de Morón vuelve a aparecer como un nodo logístico clave dentro de la arquitectura de proyección de poder de Estados Unidos. Su uso recurrente por parte de aviones cisterna KC-135 y KC-46 responde a factores bien conocidos: ubicación estratégica en el eje Atlántico–Mediterráneo, infraestructura consolidada y capacidad para sostener operaciones de largo alcance hacia el Golfo.

Las recientes salidas de aviones cisterna desde Morón, han estado apoyando vuelos de traslado y despliegue a la base aérea de Al Udeid, en Catar.

Su sincronización con otros movimientos aéreos eleva su relevancia y las sitúa claramente fuera de una simple rotación rutinaria.

itamilradar.com: 3 KC-135 en vuelo hacia la base estadounidense de Al Udeid, en Catar, desde Morón, España

El despliegue de EA-18G Growler desde la base de Rota

Más significativo resulta el movimiento de aviones EA-18G Growler de la US Navy, escoltados por cisternas, hacia posiciones avanzadas en Oriente Medio, incluyendo Catar. El Growler es un sistema especializado de guerra electrónica, diseñado para la supresión y degradación de defensas aéreas enemigas, la interferencia de radares y la protección de paquetes aéreos tanto furtivos como convencionales.

Itamilradar.com: 6 EA-18G Growler despegan desde Rota, España, en dirección a posiciones en Oriente Medio

Históricamente, el despliegue de estas plataformas ha buscado maximizar la libertad de acción aérea, especialmente frente a entornos defendidos por sistemas SAM avanzados.

Qué señala realmente esta combinación de activos

La combinación de cisternas y aeronaves de guerra electrónica apunta a un refuerzo de capacidades clave: alcance, persistencia y supervivencia. Los aviones cisterna permiten sostener operaciones a gran distancia, mientras que los Growlers reducen el riesgo operativo en caso de que el espacio aéreo se vuelva disputado.

Desde una perspectiva doctrinal, este tipo de movimientos indica una transición desde la señalización estratégica hacia la preparación operativa. No implica necesariamente una orden de ataque, pero sí la voluntad de asegurar que, si se toma una decisión política, los medios estén ya posicionados para ejecutarla sin demoras.

Irán, disuasión y especulación sobre el calendario

Algunas operaciones se planifican teniendo en cuenta factores políticos, civiles o económicos. Este fin de semana coincide con el cierre de mercados financieros, y su reanudación el lunes, sería de forma más realista, una vez confirmados los resultados de una posible acción militar.

Los avisos a civiles, despliegues navales o incrementos de retórica deben entenderse como parte de una estrategia de presión y disuasión más amplia, no como pruebas concluyentes de un conflicto inminente.

Un patrón conocido

El patrón observado encaja con episodios anteriores de tensión entre Estados Unidos e Irán: movimientos visibles pero controlados, despliegue escalonado de capacidades críticas y una ambigüedad deliberada. El objetivo principal suele ser moldear el entorno estratégico, influir en la toma de decisiones del adversario y mantener la iniciativa en la escalada.

En este marco, España, con las bases estadounidenses situadas en Rota y Morón, actúa como facilitador logístico, un papel silencioso y esencial para permitir que las fuerzas estadounidenses operen con flexibilidad y profundidad estratégica.

La actividad reciente de aviones cisterna estadounidenses y EA-18G Growler debe interpretarse como una señal de preparación seria. En los conflictos modernos, las decisiones no se anuncian de forma explícita, sino que se anticipan mediante ajustes discretos en logística, bases y activos de apoyo.

Por ahora, lo que se observa es el posicionamiento de capacidades y la apertura de opciones. La maquinaria está lista, pero aún no se ha puesto en marcha.

Ethiopia Confirms New Russian SU-30, Yak-130 Jets Amid Emirati Mirage 2000 Rumor

The recent 90th Anniversary of the Ethiopian Air Force (EtAF), celebrated at Bishoftu Air Base in January 2026, served as a definitive showcase for Addis Ababa’s aggressive modernization program. This is not merely a quantitative increase in airframes, but a calculated doctrinal shift toward a high-tech ecosystem integrating advanced training, air superiority, and multi-role versatility.

Yak-130: The Foundation for Advanced Training and CAS

A key highlight of the "Black Lion 2026" exhibition was the confirmation of the Yakovlev Yak-130 in operational service. At least six units (serials 2301 to 2306) were displayed, indicating that the first batch of an estimated 10-aircraft contract is now active.

Mission Profile: Beyond its primary role as a Lead-In Fighter Trainer (LIFT), the Yak-130's hardpoints allow it to function effectively in Close Air Support (CAS) roles.

Bridging the Gap: This platform is essential for transitioning pilots toward 4.5-generation fighters, simulating the flight profiles and avionics of heavy combat aircraft.

Su-35 and Su-30K: Consolidation of Air Superiority

The EtAF is systematically replacing its aging Su-27 fleet with modernized "Flanker" variants from various sources.

• Su-30K: Operations have been confirmed for the units delivered in 2024 (serials 2401 and 2402), which were refurbished Russian-origin aircraft formerly operated by India.
• Su-35 "Flanker-E": Credible reports indicate a contract for at least six Su-35 units. The integration of the Flanker-E provides Ethiopia with superior BVR (Beyond Visual Range) capabilities and thrust-vectoring maneuverability.

The UAE Connection: The Mirage 2000-9 and the French Approval Factor

The potential transfer of 20 Mirage 2000-9 fighters from the United Arab Emirates (UAE) would complete Ethiopia's multi-role capability. While the Su-35 and Su-30 focus on long-range air dominance, the Emirati Mirage—renowned for its advanced avionics—would provide surgical tactical flexibility.

However, a critical geopolitical hurdle remains: End-User Certificate (EUC) compliance. As the original manufacturer, France must formally approve the re-export of these aircraft to a third party. While Abu Dhabi is keen to offload the fleet to make room for its incoming Rafale F4s, Paris will weigh this decision against regional stability and its own diplomatic interests in the Horn of Africa. Without the Élysée's green light, the transfer remains a strategic ambition rather than a logistical reality.

This modernization, bolstered by Bayraktar Akinci and Orion UAVs, signals Ethiopia's intent to establish a hybrid force structure capable of regional dominance by the end of the decade.

Poland Explores Super Tucano and KC-390:

Recent high-level visits by senior Polish Air Force officials to Brazil have confirmed that Warsaw is actively evaluating the Embraer A-29 Super Tucano and the KC-390 Millennium, marking a significant evolution in Poland’s airpower doctrine. Rather than focusing exclusively on high-end combat platforms, Poland is increasingly seeking cost-effective, mission-optimised solutions to address the changing character of aerial threats in Europe.

The evaluation reflects Poland’s recognition that modern air warfare is no longer defined solely by fighter-to-fighter combat. The rapid proliferation of low-cost long-range drones, cruise missile threats, and persistent ISR challenges has created a growing demand for platforms capable of continuous surveillance, economical interception, and prolonged presence. In this context, the Super Tucano is being studied not as a counter-insurgency aircraft, but as a low-cost aerial policing and drone interception platform, capable of relieving pressure on Poland’s high-value fighter fleet.

Poland currently relies on F-16C/Ds, newly introduced FA-50 light fighters, and soon F-35A stealth aircraft to provide air defence and strike capabilities. However, employing such high-end assets against slow, low-cost UAVs is economically inefficient and operationally suboptimal. The Super Tucano offers a compelling alternative, combining long endurance, modern electro-optical sensors, low operating costs, and sufficient speed and firepower to counter asymmetric airborne threats while preserving advanced fighters for high-intensity contingencies.

This doctrinal shift mirrors a broader European reassessment of force structure priorities, already visible in Portugal’s operational use of the A-29 for maritime patrol and air policing missions. For Poland, the platform could provide persistent border surveillance, low-cost interception capability, and training synergies, particularly in an operational environment shaped by the war in Ukraine and the persistent risk of spillover incidents involving drones and loitering munitions.

Parallel to the Super Tucano evaluation, Poland is also conducting a comprehensive assessment of the KC-390 Millennium tactical transport aircraft, which is emerging as a serious contender for future Polish airlift requirements. With Poland’s C-130E/H Hercules fleet aging and facing growing maintenance challenges, the KC-390 offers a modern, jet-powered alternative capable of delivering significantly improved speed, payload, and operational flexibility.

The KC-390’s increasing adoption across Europe, including by Portugal, Hungary, the Netherlands, Austria, and the Czech Republic, has further strengthened its appeal. For Warsaw, interoperability within NATO, rapid reinforcement capability, and strategic mobility across Eastern Europe represent critical operational requirements, all of which align closely with the KC-390’s performance envelope. Reports suggest that up to ten aircraft are under consideration, though no final procurement timeline has yet been announced.

Strategically, Poland’s twin-track evaluation reflects a broader recalibration of European airpower concepts. Instead of concentrating resources exclusively on elite fighter platforms, Warsaw is increasingly investing in a balanced force structure, combining high-end combat aircraft with affordable, high-availability platforms tailored to emerging threat profiles. This layered approach enhances resilience, sustainability, and cost-effectiveness, particularly in prolonged crisis scenarios.

In this sense, Poland’s interest in both the Super Tucano and KC-390 illustrates a maturing operational doctrine shaped by real-world conflict, logistical realism, and the economic constraints of sustained high-readiness operations. It also underscores a wider European trend toward multi-tier airpower architectures, where each platform is optimized for specific mission sets rather than stretched across all roles.

Poland’s exploration of the A-29 Super Tucano and KC-390 Millennium reflects a pragmatic and strategically sound adaptation to modern air warfare realities, prioritizing efficiency, persistence, and operational flexibility alongside traditional combat power. Rather than diluting Poland’s air combat capability, this approach strengthens overall force resilience, ensuring that high-end fighters remain available for the missions that truly require them.

Iran Receives Mi-28 Attack Helicopters from Russia: Tactical Upgrade, Strategic Irrelevance

 

Recent open-source intelligence imagery and multiple defence media reports strongly suggest that Iran has begun receiving Mi-28NE “Havoc” attack helicopters from Russia, marking the first confirmed rotary-wing combat aircraft delivery under the deepening Tehran–Moscow military cooperation framework. Photographs geolocated to Iranian aerospace facilities near Tehran show at least one Mi-28 airframe undergoing inspection, likely during acceptance and evaluation procedures. Additional Russian Il-76 transport activity into Iran further supports the conclusion that initial deliveries are underway, possibly involving a small batch of three to six helicopters.

This development represents a long-overdue modernization step for Iran’s rotary-wing aviation, which remains heavily dependent on aging Cold War-era platforms such as the AH-1J SeaCobra, Mi-17 variants, and legacy utility helicopters acquired before the 1979 revolution. Sanctions, spare parts shortages, and decades of isolation have left Iran’s helicopter fleet technologically outdated and operationally constrained. In this context, the Mi-28 provides Tehran with a modern sensor suite, improved night-fighting capability, better survivability, and significantly enhanced precision strike potential compared to its current inventory.

However, despite the symbolic value and tactical improvements, the strategic implications of this acquisition remain extremely limited. The Mi-28 is a capable battlefield attack helicopter, but it does not alter the regional balance of power. In any confrontation involving the United States or NATO-aligned forces, Iran would face overwhelming air dominance, advanced ISR coverage, electronic warfare superiority, and layered air defence networks. Against such an environment, small numbers of attack helicopters offer negligible deterrent value and limited survivability.

Operational experience from Ukraine has further exposed structural vulnerabilities in Russian attack helicopter doctrine, particularly against modern MANPADS, mobile air defence systems, precision-guided artillery, and networked battlefield sensors. Loss rates of Russian rotary-wing assets have been significant, highlighting that attack helicopters face increasingly hostile operating environments even in medium-intensity conflicts, let alone in high-end engagements involving Western forces.

From a doctrinal perspective, the Mi-28 will likely serve primarily in asymmetric and regional scenarios, including internal security operations, border surveillance, limited expeditionary support to Iranian-aligned militias, and maritime harassment roles in the Persian Gulf. Its deployment would enhance Iran’s capacity to conduct localized power projection, but without providing the strategic depth required to challenge US or allied air superiority.

Moreover, the sustainability of Mi-28 operations inside Iran remains uncertain. Sanctions, logistical bottlenecks, spare parts dependency on Russia, and training pipeline limitations will restrict operational readiness and fleet availability. Without long-term maintenance support and continuous training cycles, Iran risks replicating the low availability rates seen across much of its current combat aviation inventory.

In strategic terms, this acquisition should therefore be viewed as a marginal upgrade rather than a transformational leap. It improves Iran’s tactical options but does not meaningfully strengthen deterrence, nor does it shift the military balance in the Middle East. For Washington and its allies, the Mi-28 delivery represents background noise rather than escalation, reinforcing existing assessments of Iranian military modernization rather than challenging them.

Libya Signs for JF-17 Fighters: Pakistan’s First Arab Customer

 

Libya appears poised to become the first Arab operator of the Pakistan–China co-developed JF-17 Thunder, following credible international reporting that confirms a major defence agreement between Pakistan and Libya’s eastern-based Libyan National Army (LNA). If implemented, the deal would represent not only one of Pakistan’s largest-ever arms exports, but also a profound shift in Libya’s future airpower trajectory after more than a decade of conflict, fragmentation, and sanctions.

According to multiple authoritative sources, including Reuters and major Pakistani defence outlets, the agreement covers the acquisition of 16 JF-17 multirole fighter aircraft, alongside 12 Super Mushak trainer aircraft, pilot and technician training, logistical support, and broader military cooperation. The estimated value of the deal ranges between $4 and $4.6 billion, making it one of the most significant defence export contracts in Pakistan’s history.

The Libya–Pakistan defence agreement, including the JF-17 fighter deal, was signed in late January 2026, during a high-level visit by senior Libyan National Army (LNA) representatives to Islamabad, according to Reuters reporting and Pakistani defence ministry sources.

While no formal public signing ceremony was broadcast, multiple diplomatic and defence-industry sources confirmed that final contractual approval was reached between January 22–26, 2026, following several months of negotiations and technical evaluations.

For Libya, the significance of this development cannot be overstated. Since the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, Libyan airpower has steadily deteriorated. Once one of the largest and most capable air forces in North Africa, Libya today operates a fragmented and aging fleet composed mainly of legacy MiG-21s, MiG-23s, limited MiG-29s, and a small number of restored Mirage F1 aircraft. Maintenance challenges, shortages of spare parts, pilot attrition, and combat losses have severely degraded operational readiness.

The introduction of a modern multirole fighter such as the JF-17 would instantly alter this picture. Equipped with modern avionics, active electronically scanned array radar options, precision-guided munitions, and beyond-visual-range air-to-air missiles, the JF-17 offers a credible leap into 4.5-generation combat capability. For the Libyan National Army, this would provide not only a significant boost in air superiority and strike potential, but also a symbolic demonstration of military modernisation and political legitimacy.

Strategically, the choice of the JF-17 is revealing. Western fighter aircraft remain politically inaccessible due to sanctions, human rights concerns, and unresolved legitimacy issues surrounding Libya’s competing authorities. Russian combat aircraft, while available, present logistical, financial, and geopolitical risks amid Moscow’s own operational commitments and growing international isolation. In this context, Pakistan offers a politically flexible, cost-effective, and technically capable alternative, supported by Chinese industrial backing and supply chains.

For Pakistan, the Libyan agreement represents a breakthrough moment in its defence export ambitions. The JF-17 programme has long sought to establish itself as a credible competitor in the global light fighter market, targeting air forces constrained by limited budgets, political restrictions, or sanctions. While earlier exports to Myanmar and Nigeria validated the platform’s export viability, Libya would mark the first Arab and North African customer, opening an entirely new strategic market space.

This deal also strengthens Pakistan’s broader geopolitical footprint in North Africa and the Mediterranean region. By becoming a long-term supplier of combat aircraft, training, and logistical support, Islamabad embeds itself deeply into Libya’s future military architecture. Such relationships tend to endure for decades, shaping doctrine, interoperability, and procurement alignment.

However, the agreement is not without controversy. Libya remains subject to a United Nations arms embargo, and while the Libyan National Army claims legal justifications under existing frameworks, the international community remains divided on the legitimacy of large-scale arms transfers. Western governments are likely to scrutinise any delivery process closely, potentially exerting diplomatic pressure to delay or limit implementation.

Despite these obstacles, available evidence suggests that preparations are moving forward. Training pipelines, infrastructure upgrades, and logistical planning reportedly form part of the broader agreement, indicating that this is not a symbolic or preliminary memorandum, but a structured long-term programme.

The deal also reflects a deeper structural trend: the gradual emergence of non-Western suppliers as dominant players in politically complex markets. Pakistan, supported by China’s industrial base, is positioning itself as a strategic alternative to traditional Western and Russian arms exporters, offering flexible financing, political neutrality, and adaptable support models.

If successfully implemented, the Libyan JF-17 programme may well become a flagship case study for Pakistan’s future defence exports, and a model for similar acquisitions across Africa, the Middle East, and parts of Asia.

In this context, Libya’s decision represents more than a fighter acquisition. It signals a strategic realignment, a reconstruction of national military capability, and the quiet entry of Pakistan into the heart of North African defence geopolitics.

🇲🇦 Morocco & 🇵🇰 Pakistan in JF-17 Talks ?

Recent defence cooperation developments between Morocco and Pakistan have reignited speculation over a possible Moroccan acquisition of the JF-17 Thunder multirole fighter. While no contract has been signed, multiple defence media outlets and analyst sources now confirm that Rabat is actively exploring the option, marking a potentially significant shift in Moroccan airpower planning.

Rather than signaling a departure from Morocco’s close alignment with Western defence suppliers, this move appears driven by pragmatic operational and strategic considerations.

In January 2026, Morocco and Pakistan formalised a bilateral defence cooperation agreement covering military training, intelligence cooperation, defence industrial collaboration, and joint exercises.

Shortly after the signing, specialist defence journalists and regional analysts reported that combat aircraft discussions formed part of this broader framework, with the JF-17 Block III emerging as the primary focus.

While official statements remain limited, reporting from regional defence correspondents, Pakistani defence sources, and specialist aviation media indicates that Morocco is now among a group of countries engaged in advanced exploratory talks with Pakistan regarding the JF-17 platform.

At this stage, no numbers, timelines, or contractual commitments have been disclosed.

Why Would Morocco Consider the JF-17?

At first glance, Moroccan interest in a Chinese-Pakistani fighter appears counterintuitive. The Royal Moroccan Air Force (RMAF) is heavily invested in Western platforms, particularly F-16C/D Fighting Falcons, F-16 Block 70/72 modernization and NATO-aligned doctrine and interoperability

However, a deeper look suggests a rational strategic logic behind exploring the JF-17.

1. Fleet Mass and Cost Efficiency

The JF-17 offers modern multirole capability at significantly lower acquisition and operating costs than Western fighters. This enables:

• Larger squadron numbers
• Greater sortie generation capacity
• Lower operational strain on high-end platforms

In modern air warfare, fleet size and sustainability increasingly matter as much as individual aircraft performance.

2. Layered Airpower Structure

Rather than replacing F-16s, the JF-17 could serve as:

• A light multirole fighter
• An advanced training platform
• A secondary strike and air policing asset

This layered approach would allow Morocco to preserve F-16 flight hours for high-end missions, while maintaining broad territorial coverage and readiness.

3. Strategic Diversification

Like many mid-sized powers, Morocco is seeking greater autonomy in defence procurement. Introducing a non-Western combat platform:

• Reduces vulnerability to political export restrictions
• Increases diplomatic leverage
• Strengthens strategic independence

This does not represent a geopolitical shift, but rather risk diversification within procurement strategy.

Why the JF-17 Block III?

The Block III variant significantly enhances the aircraft’s appeal, featuring:

• AESA radar
• Modern electronic warfare systems
• Helmet-mounted targeting
• Advanced datalink and sensor fusion
• BVR missile capability

This positions the JF-17 Block III as a credible light multirole fighter, capable of air policing, strike missions, and limited air superiority roles.

Operational and Political Challenges

Despite its advantages, a Moroccan JF-17 acquisition would introduce notable complexities.

• Logistical Integration
• New maintenance ecosystems
• Different supply chains
• Parallel training systems

This would increase operational complexity for a force currently optimized around Western platforms.

Interoperability Constraints

Operating Chinese-Pakistani avionics alongside NATO systems introduces data integration and interoperability challenges, particularly during joint exercises and multinational operations.

Strategic Perception

A JF-17 deal would likely attract attention from Western partners, particularly the United States and France, although Morocco’s consistent procurement of US systems suggests no fundamental shift in strategic alignment.

Likely Scale and Scope

If pursued, a Moroccan JF-17 acquisition would most likely involve:

• Limited numbers
• Secondary mission roles
• Training and fleet expansion purposes

This would mirror procurement strategies adopted by other air forces balancing cost, capability, and political autonomy.

Morocco’s exploration of the JF-17 reflects pragmatic force planning rather than geopolitical realignment.

The move aligns with:

• Expanding fleet mass
• Budget efficiency
• Strategic diversification

Rather than replacing Western combat aircraft, the JF-17 would complement existing F-16 capability, allowing the Royal Moroccan Air Force to preserve its high-end assets while expanding overall operational capacity.

If formalized, this deal would represent a subtle but significant evolution in Moroccan airpower doctrine, emphasizing sustainability, flexibility, and strategic autonomy.